DEMOCRATIC OSCILLATIONS IN BURKINA FASO

November 2024

A case study by Fondemos

Why does Burkina Faso oscillate between democratic hopes and authoritarian excesses?

INTRODUCTION

On October 31, 2014, a popular uprising overthrew in two days the twenty-seven years of authoritarian rule by Blaise Compaoré, a pivotal moment which, in hindsight, reveals the underlying dynamics as well as the factors of change. The spark of the insurrection was yet another attempt to amend the Constitution for the benefit of the President, eager to extend his term. It brought constitutional reforms and civil society’s commitment to democratization back to the center of public debate and offered new hope to Burkinabe demands.

Ten years later, Burkina Faso is governed by a military junta that seized power through a coup d’état in 2022. The return to a government in uniform, and the extension in May 2024 of the transition period by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, illustrate the persistent challenges of governance and security facing the country. This “dual façade democracy” had indeed maintained for several decades a hybrid regime where the holding of elections was only a façade of democracy, not enough to hide the authoritarian nature of the government ¹. Moreover, the security situation remains extremely tense: Islamist armed groups control certain regions of the country, particularly in border areas, causing population displacement and a severe humanitarian crisis.

Looking back on the October 2014 episode allows us to consider the events through which civil society massively mobilized, but also to understand the reasons for the democratic setback that followed.

I. REMINDER OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF BURKINA FASO

Consolidation of power and multiple crises in Upper Volta: from Yaméogo to Sankara

Maurice Yaméogo was president of Upper Volta when it gained independence from France on August 5, 1960. Yaméogo continued the consolidation of power already begun before independence and started by eliminating parliamentary opposition. On February 28 of the same year, having obtained special powers from the Assembly, he decided to dissolve it. Thanks to a new redistricting strategy, he managed to make his group the majority party. He dissolved several opposition parties, such as the Voltaic National Party (PNV), the Republican Party of Liberty (PRL), and the Peasant Action Party (PAP), and imprisoned opposition figures. On November 30, 1960, the dictatorship adopted a new framework and proclaimed a new constitution.

Upper Volta then faced many crises. First a social crisis, with the administrative abolition of chieftaincies in January 1962, which undermined the traditional structure of Burkinabe society. This authoritarian act indeed weakened a central component of the political space: more than three-quarters of the population is rural, and among them, as still indicated by an Afrobarometer opinion survey ² conducted in 2008, 75% of respondents trust traditional leaders.

These leaders act as intermediaries between the central government and local populations, and the state knows it must rely on their assent if it wants to enforce the law³. According to Arsène Brice Bado, “as administrative and political entities of traditional societies, chieftaincies compete with the state and its administrations. […] The non-integration of these two systems of governance weakens the state as well as the functioning of democracy.” Another component that deepens the social crisis is the growing contempt of the central power for religion, a disastrous health situation, and a lack of teachers.

Then an economic crisis: like many African countries in the post-colonial era, Burkina Faso experienced major funding difficulties after its independence. To try to revive the economy, Maurice Yaméogo imposed severe austerity measures: wage cuts for civil servants and tax increases. These measures worsened popular discontent, especially among unions and civil service. These economic choices, combined with the lack of investment in key sectors like education and health, caused growing dissatisfaction among the population. In 1966, massive strikes by unions and students broke out. These troubles led to the forced resignation of Yaméogo following a military coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Sangoulé Lamizana.

Despite the critical situation, Lamizana continued the anti-democratic shift. In 1970, he had a new constitution adopted allowing him to become President without consulting the people, then appointed Joseph Ouédraogo as Prime Minister. However, their relationship gradually deteriorated, and Sangoulé Lamizana decided to suspend the Constitution to renew the government, making it exclusively military.

In 1980, many strikes broke out across the country, paralyzing entire sectors. Saye Zerbo then took power through another coup d’état, before being overthrown on November 7, 1982 by Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo and his Prime Minister, Thomas Sankara. In May 1983, Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo dismissed Thomas Sankara, who, three months later, seized power himself, also via a coup.

Reforms and tensions at the heart of the Burkinabe revolution

Thomas Sankara’s rise to power marked a significant turning point in the country’s history. He gave Upper Volta a new name: Burkina Faso, which means “the land of upright men.” Under his leadership, the country took its first steps toward democracy, with a desire to empower the people and promote social justice. Politically, Sankara placed great importance on transparency, even publicly declaring his assets. He limited state spending and fought against corruption and clientelism⁴.

Sankara launched a revolutionary program aimed at transforming Burkinabe society through radical reforms in the economy, agriculture, health, and women’s rights. Economically, he sought to avoid any external dependency and aimed for food self-sufficiency. He stimulated the internal industrial economy by promoting local production. In foreign policy, Sankara openly criticized the excesses of globalization and adopted an anti-imperialist stance. While these reforms benefited some parts of the population, they also caused discontent, notably among civil servants, whose privileges were curtailed. Austerity measures, the nationalization of certain industries, and tensions with neighboring countries also contributed to weakening Burkina Faso, which found itself diplomatically isolated, increasing pressure on the regime. The reforms also sparked resistance among traditional elites, the military, and even his own allies in the National Council of the Revolution (CNR). Some government members began criticizing his authoritarian approach and lack of consultation. Sankara’s growing isolation within the CNR exacerbated internal tensions, especially with his close friend and longtime colleague, Blaise Compaoré.

Ultimately, Compaoré orchestrated his assassination on October 15, 1987, and seized power by force. Thomas Sankara left behind a major political legacy, which would later be invoked by the actors of the uprising in question.

Compaoré in power: towards a controlled democracy and the reinvention of the regime

Compaoré imposed a government formed by the Popular Front, a coalition of several political parties that supported the new head of state. In June 1991, a new constitution was implemented, introducing multipartyism, the separation of powers, a two-term limit for seven-year presidential mandates, the organization of regular and transparent elections, administrative decentralization, the creation of a Constitutional Court, and the application of certain fundamental rights (freedom of the press, freedom of association, etc.). These advances gradually established a democratic model, supported by the so-called “rectification” process.

The “rectification” was presented as a political approach aiming to slow down the revolutionary process and appease the population. This process was based on a critique of Sankara’s policies. Thus, Blaise Compaoré sought to moderate revolutionary ideas and leaned toward more liberal policies, notably by implementing structural adjustment programs in collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank. The rectification also aimed to reconcile the government with certain traditional and religious elites, often marginalized under Sankara, while neutralizing revolutionary popular structures, such as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs).

However, the ruling party controlled all administrative and governmental institutions, allowing no political alternation. The liberalization of political life was therefore far from complete: the military still held a central role in the government, political opponents were repressed, often imprisoned or persecuted. In summary, the regime established by Compaoré more closely resembled an “electoral autocracy” than a genuine democracy, which is confirmed by the longevity of his term (27 years), made possible by multiple constitutional amendments.

II. FROM INSURRECTION TO TRANSITION: DYNAMICS AND LIMITS OF THE 2014–2015 UPRISINGS

Chronicle of the 2014–2015 uprisings

In 2013, an opposition party, the Union for Progress and Change (UPC), led protests against the creation of a Senate. This institution risked serving to maintain Blaise Compaoré in power, being mostly composed of senators appointed by him and chaired by his brother. A year later, close allies of Compaoré resigned to form a new party, the People’s Movement for Progress. Civil society associations and movements also joined in expressing discontent with Compaoré’s government.

Starting on October 21, 2014, civil society organizations, unions, and associations (such as Balai Citoyen, the Citizen Resistance Front, the Anti-Referendum Collective, the Women’s Collective for the Defense of the Constitution, and the Coalition Against High Cost of Living) mobilized in the streets to protest the amendment of Article 37 of the Constitution, which limited presidential mandates to two terms.

Amid this fervor, on October 30, protesters stormed and set fire to the National Assembly. Law enforcement proved insufficient in the face of massive mobilization⁵. In some areas, they hesitated to use excessive force against fellow citizens, allowing protesters to advance. In some cases, security forces even joined the demonstrators or chose to remain neutral.

The size of the crowd was unprecedented: it was estimated at tens of thousands. Protesters targeted the homes of several government members, looting and ransacking them, as well as the headquarters of national television stations. They then marched to key power sites to express their demands: the presidential palace, the Place de la Nation (renamed Place de la Révolution for the occasion), and the army headquarters. The government abandoned the bill, but Blaise Compaoré simultaneously dissolved the Assembly. Following these events, Blaise Compaoré fled to Côte d’Ivoire. On October 31, Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida seized power with the support of the army and was named Head of State for the Transition.

However, the organizations that had mobilized in the streets were accused of having “sold the revolution” to the military. Confrontations then erupted between demonstrators. Two days later, the junta led by Zida decided to meet with representatives from each political party to resolve the crisis and create the Transitional Charter, according to which the President of the Transition and his government would not be eligible for the upcoming 2015 presidential elections. On November 16, Michel Kafando was appointed President of the Transition and Zida was named Prime Minister. In September 2015, a coup was attempted by the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP), an elite unit loyal to Compaoré. The troops succeeded in arresting transitional leaders, but the coup failed due to dual opposition: civilian, with thousands of citizens in the streets; and military, with loyalist army units quickly converging on Ouagadougou, threatening to attack the Naaba Koom camp (RSP headquarters), thus forcing the putschists to surrender. It was quickly dubbed by locals as “the dumbest coup in the world.” Presidential and legislative elections did eventually take place, albeit a month late⁶. Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was elected president.

Explanatory factors of the 2014–2015 uprisings

Since Sankara’s revolution, Burkinabe citizens have viewed their participation in political life differently and aspired to the change it promised, as evidenced by the recurring slogan “Nothing will ever be the same again!” Sankara’s legacy is evident in the symbols used by major activist collectives. The broom, which gives its name to Balai Citoyen, refers to the gesture of the revolutionary president, known for literally and symbolically sweeping the streets of Ouagadougou. He sought to illustrate the importance of everyone’s participation, including leaders, in improving living conditions in the community, and the need to clean up political life by ridding it of corruption.

The 2014 demonstrators relied on an engaged popular culture, notably referencing an album by rapper Smarty and the Bolo Benn Roots⁷, cited by Pierre Jacquemot in his book *Africa, Democracy on Trial*: “The chief’s hat floats in the air / Heads clash to see who will wear it / May peace go die in war! / As long as one head is crowned king […] / The problem of a king is the gap between the truth received… / And what the people think of him / Despite growing tension… / It’s to the same tunes that the king’s griot dances. […]” Thus, Jacquemot concludes, was born “streetocracy,” the use of the “legitimacy of the street” to demand solutions to fundamental political and everyday issues⁸.

The political engagement of the Burkinabe population also advanced through social media, which were essential for spreading calls to uprising, organizing protests in real-time while bypassing censorship, raising public awareness nationally and internationally, and giving a voice to marginalized populations.

However, street power alone does not fully explain the October 2014 overthrow: the role of political entrepreneurs must also be considered as drivers of the revolt. They viewed Compaoré’s attempt to amend the Constitution as a moment to seize. Figures such as Michel Kafando and Yacouba Isaac Zida took hold of this “window of opportunity”⁹ to introduce reforms and restructure the country’s institutional framework. The idea of a window of opportunity, as defined by John Kingdon¹⁰, refers to a moment conducive to change where three streams converge: problems (a crisis), solutions (proposals to address it), and politics (a favorable environment for change). When these align, political entrepreneurs can act swiftly. In Burkina Faso’s case, new political leaders spotlighted the issues and proposed institutional reforms.

Finally, it is worth noting the crucial role traditional chiefs played in the 2014 uprising, as their intervention enabled significant mobilization in rural areas. They legitimized the protest movement initiated in Ouagadougou throughout the country, thereby contributing to its success.

Limits of the transition

The transitional regime in Burkina Faso, established after the fall of Blaise Compaoré, was marked by internal tensions that weakened its functioning. At the heart of these tensions was the complex relationship between President Michel Kafando, a civilian diplomat, and Prime Minister Yacouba Isaac Zida, a high-ranking military officer.

From the outset, this duality between civilian and military governance created a conflictual dynamic. Kafando, chosen to embody the popular aspiration for a return to consensual governance, advocated for prudence and dialogue. On the other hand, Zida, who had played a crucial role in managing the post-uprising period, defended a more authoritarian approach and rapid reforms to break with the old regime.

The issue of dissolving the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) became the main point of contention. Zida, a former member of this elite unit, turned against it, considering the RSP a barrier to democratic reforms. He actively advocated for its dismantling. In contrast, Kafando, aware of the risks of a direct confrontation with this influential military group, opted for a more measured approach, seeking to maintain a fragile balance. These disagreements hindered the coherence and effectiveness of the transitional regime. Unable to reconcile these divergent visions, the transition gradually stalled, leaving the country in a precarious political situation. Thus, the absence of a single leader, though commendable in principle, made reform and democratization efforts more difficult.

Furthermore, to consolidate the democratic transition, the government established several political bodies intended as counterbalances. However, they proved ineffective, as “the Zida government undertook reforms as if the CRNR (National Reconciliation and Reform Commission) did not exist, while the latter was working on reform proposals.” The different political bodies did not cooperate with each other, and contradictory work emerged from each organization, hindering the Transition. “This lack of synergy reflects the divergence of objectives that characterized this tripartite power structure”¹¹ (CRNR, National Transitional Council, and government).

Finally, although presidential and legislative elections were held, the democratic process was interrupted by the two coups d’état in 2022. The coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba in January 2022 was motivated by growing dissatisfaction within the army over the government’s inability to manage insecurity caused by jihadist attacks. On January 24, 2022, Damiba and his supporters overthrew President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. He then dissolved the government and suspended the Constitution, promising to restore security and establish a political transition timeline. The coup by Captain Ibrahim Traoré followed on September 30 of the same year, citing the same issues as Damiba.

III. TODAY, THE JUNTA IN POWER

Overview of the current situation in Burkina Faso

Since coming to power, Ibrahim Traoré has implemented several measures to try to stabilize the country’s security situation. He has reorganized the defense and security forces, acquired new military equipment, and recruited additional soldiers. Since the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016, the country has been in constant struggle against terrorism. Traoré thus invokes this security crisis to delay the elections initially planned for mid-July 2024: in August 2024, he stated that he preferred to focus on the country’s stability. According to him, holding elections in the current context would prevent equitable participation from all Burkinabe citizens. While he has presented himself from the outset as the rightful heir to Sankarism, the opposition and press are muzzled, and critics of the regime are intimidated, imprisoned, and sometimes abducted (such as the activist Guy Hervé Kam—a figure of the anti-Compaoré protest¹², the former minister Ablassé Ouedraogo¹³, journalist Atiana Serge Oulon¹⁴, or artist Moussa Thiombiano).

What democratic future for Burkina Faso?

In West Africa, Senegal and Ghana have respectively followed the democratic model since 1960 and 1992. Their experience highlights several crucial elements for the stability of democratic power: committed leadership respecting power transitions; strong institutions fighting against corruption; political neutrality of the armed forces; and freedom of the press. These factors have had a virtuous effect on managing internal and external crises.

However, while these democratic systems may seem desirable for Burkina Faso, it would be wise to consider adapting them to traditional political systems. As demonstrated by the 2014 uprising, traditional chiefs can be important actors in state politics, acting as “intermediaries between their local communities and the central government.” Yet, as Arsène Brice Bado explains, “traditional and modern governance systems coexist without truly interpenetrating or merging into a single system on which the State could rely to establish its authority over the entire national territory”¹⁵.

CONCLUSION

Massive mobilization

These uprisings were marked by a massive mobilization of the Burkinabe people across the country. This engagement was relayed by key actors at various levels: traditional leaders in rural areas who encouraged the spread of the movement, and political entrepreneurs who seized the opportunity to assert themselves as legitimate leaders and initiate institutional changes.

Use of social media and popular culture

These uprisings were made possible by new vectors of mobilization for the population. The use of social media made it possible to circumvent censorship and raise awareness among as many citizens as possible. Activist movements relied on symbols and figures from popular culture, especially rap.

A military presence that hinders the transition

However, the Transition did not result in a truly democratic regime, mainly due to the strong military presence in the political body. The presence of the army caused many disagreements, highlighting the government’s weaknesses and the lack of shared ideological principles at the origin of the transition. The security situation, plagued by terrorism, maintained a vicious circle used as a pretext for strong military rule.

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3. Political science and international relations researcher at CERAP/Jesuit University in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, specialist in the relationship between democracy and ethnic pluralism
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7. An academic turned diplomat, he held posts in several African countries (Senegal, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, Ghana, Democratic Republic of the Congo)
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10. Political scientist, emeritus professor at the University of Michigan.
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