CITIZEN MOBILIZATIONS IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA

A Mixed Record: Congolese, Chadian, Cameroonian, Senegalese, and Guinean Examples

Abidjan, May 2024

A Fondemos Intervention at the International Colloquium of the Foundation for Innovation in Democracy (FIDEMO) and the Research Institute for Development (IRD)

The Research Institute for Development (IRD) in Côte d’Ivoire and the Foundation for Innovation in Democracy organized an international colloquium on May 23–24, 2024, in Yamoussoukro, titled: “Public Action and Citizen Mobilizations in Africa.” This gathering brought together over 65 scientists and activists from three continents (Africa, North America, Europe).

The director of Fondemos participated with a presentation entitled: “Citizen Mobilizations in Francophone Africa: A Mixed Record—Congolese, Chadian, Cameroonian, Senegalese, and Guinean Examples.”

On the democratic front, there have recently been more blockages, regressions, and even backsliding than progress in terms of citizen representation, both on the African continent and elsewhere. Recent events in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso serve as reminders, as do those in the United States: unfortunately, Tocqueville was not mistaken. In several democracies in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in its Francophone regions, institutions seem paralyzed, and resilient citizens do not always exert enough pressure on their leaders to hope for improved governance.

Thus, despite optimistic narratives about “Africa being the new China,” the emergence of a middle class, and the demographic dividend, stepping outside the affluent neighborhoods of African capitals reveals significant governance issues in many countries due to a lack of accountability: leaders do not feel compelled to be transparent and responsible to their citizens. Nevertheless, nothing can happen without the citizens themselves: the destinies of African citizens cannot be shaped without their involvement.

If they are aware and mobilized, they can stand up to external powers, financial institutions, markets, and international organizations. More importantly, they can demand transparency and honesty from their leaders. Nothing sustainable can be achieved without the people or behind their backs, as the following examples demonstrate.

Allow me to quote Richard Banégas, who was my professor at the Sorbonne in the early 2000s when Paris 1 launched a Master’s program in “African Studies”: “Since 2011, following the Arab Spring, new citizen movements have emerged, such as ‘Y en a marre’ in Senegal, ‘Balai citoyen’ in Burkina Faso, ‘Togo debout,’ the FNDC in Guinea, ‘Filimbi’ and ‘Lucha’ in the DRC, ‘Walk to Work’ in Uganda, EndSars in Nigeria, the Hirak in Algeria, ‘E Muito’ in Angola, and various components of the ‘Tournons la page’ coalition in Niger, Gabon, and elsewhere. These movements unite to oppose electoral manipulations and demand adherence to constitutional rules, primarily the limitation of presidential terms. They innovate through their organizational methods, which are more horizontal, their ways of mobilizing the masses, and their forms of civic engagement.”

These hopeful movements have indeed highlighted the potential power of civil societies when driven by organized and charismatic leaders, such as Bobi Wine in Uganda or Luaty Beirão in Angola, both musicians turned activist leaders effecting change in their respective countries.

However, the road ahead remains long: the Arab revolutions of 2011 did not lead to similar movements in sub-Saharan Africa, nor did the confinement and socio-economic tensions caused by COVID-19 serve as the anticipated catalyst for the downfall of long-standing dictators disconnected from their peoples, like Sassou Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville or the Bongo family in Gabon (it was a coup several years later that led to the latter’s fall).

The NGO Fondemos aims to support civil society movements striving to advance political freedoms in their respective countries. This involves advocacy on their behalf, lobbying in Paris and Brussels, providing financial and material assistance as resources allow, and, importantly, sharing potentially successful methods observed elsewhere through the dissemination of best practices, including tailored training sessions presented in situ or via video, and made available (e.g., “how to conduct a citizen electoral observation mission,” “how to enhance activist mobilization and sustain the movement,” “how to manage public relations,” “how to utilize international law,” “how to protect communications and data,” “how to conduct peaceful demonstrations,” “how to manage democratic transitions,” “how to develop a program,” etc.).

Fondemos is, for instance, involved in supporting civil society in the DRC, where the fact that Kabila Jr. was forced to relinquish the presidency in 2018 is indeed progress, but he managed to install his candidate, Tshisekedi (who later definitively sidelined him from state affairs): the journey is far from over.

Fondemos is also active in supporting civil society in Chad, where young Déby does not seem inclined to open up the authoritarian power inherited from his father. Professor Akindès’s phrase, “tears and blood as the building material of democracy, with freedom as the ideal,” resonates strongly in the Chadian context, where 300 young pro-democracy civil society activists were killed by Chadian security forces in October 2022.

Finally, Fondemos supports civil society in Cameroon, notably the “Solidarité Jeunes” movement, born in 2024 from the desire of young Cameroonians to become catalysts for the emergence of new social forces in their country. They emphasize that “trust, courage, and determination are values we must cultivate if we want to achieve our goals, namely the mobilization of youth and the establishment of well-structured non-violent actions.” They also state that they are preparing not for the next elections, i.e., 2025 (Paul Biya will then be 92 years old), but for the ones after, knowing that awareness and re-politicization take time.

Thus, the path remains long, but two recent and hopeful examples remind us that the worst is never certain:

First, in Senegal, where the political context during the 2024 presidential elections was tense, with intense popular demonstrations, a violent police response, the main opponent imprisoned, and the election (initially scheduled for February) postponed. Paradoxically, all this heightened voters’ determination to participate in the democratic process, and the anger and desire for change translated into a protest vote against the outgoing regime, embodied by Macky Sall and his candidate Amadou Ba.

Senegal is, along with Côte d’Ivoire, one of the wealthiest countries in the sub-region; consequently, the middle class is more substantial than in neighboring countries; as a result, Senegalese civil society is more developed and active, playing a watchdog role during these elections by ensuring the transparency and security of the electoral process. Indeed, thousands of national observers were deployed to oversee the vote, thereby guaranteeing the credibility of the results.

To mention two frontline organizations:

• “Aar Sunu Election,” meaning “Protect Our Election” in Wolof, which was very active;
• The “F24” coalition, comprising 150 political parties and civil society organizations mobilized in protest against the election postponement.

Senegalese civil society and citizens thus played a crucial role in upholding the electoral deadline. The massive mobilization of youth was particularly decisive, marking a historic turning point in the country’s electoral dynamics: “those of us working on electoral sociology always reach strong conclusions that young people do not vote. The massive participation of young people this time was salutary: they voted en masse and helped secure the vote.”

Another hopeful case study is Guinea, where it is essential first to recall the context: the explosion that destroyed Conakry’s main oil depot at the end of 2023, in addition to significant human losses, caused a fuel supply crisis and a sharp increase in inflation, plunging the country even deeper into a pre-existing economic crisis. The near absence of price controls on goods further exacerbated the consequences for the population. Despite a protocol signed at the end of January 2024 between the junta and economic sector actors to impose price caps on certain primary products, there was still an increase in the average price of these goods. Popular discontent was thus present, awaiting organization and leadership—which were also lacking.

The spark that ignited the protest movement was the arrest of Sékou Jamal Pendessa, a Guinean journalist and trade unionist, on January 19, 2024. He had organized a demonstration titled “Human Wave on Conakry” to protest against internet access restrictions and, more broadly, the repression by the so-called “transition” authorities (a prolonged transition, as they have been in power since the coup d’état of September 5, 2021).

In summary, there were specific demands for improved political transparency in the country, an end to authoritarian governance practices, and effective public policies to combat inflation and the general economic crisis. The arrest of Sékou Jamal Pendessa catalyzed these grievances into a broader protest movement.

On January 22, the trade unionist and journalist Sékou Jamal Pendessa was charged with “participation in an unauthorized public demonstration and publication of data likely to disturb security and public order” and placed in pre-trial detention at Conakry prison.

On February 19, 2024, the junta announced by decree the dissolution of the transitional government and ordered the freezing of the bank accounts of government members and even the confiscation of their passports. However, this was somewhat late to quell the unrest, and on February 26, 2024, a general protest movement began, initiated by the country’s thirteen trade union centers, supported by the main political parties and civil society organizations. This unity was the key to victory: for three days, across much of the territory, businesses, banks, and schools remained closed, and the administration was paralyzed.

The military in power had never faced a movement of such magnitude, involving the entire Guinean population. As the junta had banned gatherings and demonstrations, the general protest transformed into a complete shutdown of the country when trade unions simply asked workers to stay home. Spontaneous demonstrations still occurred in northern Conakry, resulting in two deaths and over a dozen injuries, and the general strike lasted three days, ending on February 28, 2024, after the release of Sékou Jamal Pendessa, a condition considered a prerequisite for any discussion. Faced with this unprecedented social movement, the junta was thus forced to yield.

For Sékou Jamal Pendessa, his release is “a victory for democracy, for justice against injustice, for justice against arbitrariness. The fight against dictatorship continues, and we will intensify our efforts to show the authorities that they do not hold the right of life and death over the population.”

It is, therefore, fair to conclude that, without resorting to violence, this general strike serves as a compelling example of the effectiveness of civil society movements. In a country where freedom of speech is stifled, and opposition is repressed, unified coordination and opposition to the junta can drive progress.