AFRICA: AMBIGUOUS TRANSITIONS

December 2018

A Fondemos Perspective
Originally published in the magazine ‘Conflits’

Afro-optimists who view Africa as “the next China” :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0} versus Afro-pessimists deeming the continent’s future “hopeless” :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1} engage in a sterile and disconnected debate from the actual state of a region too diverse to be labeled uniformly: Sub-Saharan African countries (excluding island states) do share some characteristics, but more importantly, they possess numerous singularities that render such generalizations ineffective.

With complexity back in vogue, it is now appropriate to distinguish at least six categories in terms of development (a country may simultaneously belong to several of them):

• The continent’s exemplary performers, namely emerging countries such as Botswana, Rwanda, Ghana, or Ethiopia (all English-speaking, incidentally, with Rwanda now also led by an Anglophone elite; the appointment of Louise Mushikiwabo :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2} as head of the International Organization of La Francophonie doesn’t alter this dynamic).

• The overtly oil-rich states (Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, Nigeria, Angola), which have lived off a rent neither distributed nor reinvested, and which have been particularly affected by the drop in oil prices due to the lack of prior economic diversification (leading to an atrophied agricultural sector).

• The Sahelian belt, a source of great concern :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}, whose fragility is exacerbated by demographics and climate change, with the corollary of opportunistic pseudo-terrorism resembling murderous banditry. Two giants already teetering on the brink of chaos, albeit for different reasons, and potentially dragging their neighbors along: Nigeria :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4} and the DRC :contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}.

• The failed states (Rotberg, R. (2011). Failed States, Collapsed States, and Weak States: Causes and Indicators.): Somalia, Central African Republic, South Sudan.

• The “soft underbelly,” that is, all the others, subsisting while awaiting either explosion or miracle; increasingly urban, increasingly populous, they are major sources of migrants. Their uncertain future depends on decisions made (or not) and implemented (or not) by their leaders, funded by an international community (UN, EU, IMF, WB) as passive as it is powerless.

Regarding democratic practices, again, there are exemplary performers like Senegal, Benin, or Botswana; there are the laggards (Sassou, Bongo, Obiang, Eyadema, Kabila, Afewerki, etc.); and there is the “soft underbelly” of poorly established “democratures.”

Once more, the laggards are predominantly Francophone. They captivate French diplomats and journalists, thereby overshadowing a silent (r)evolution underway concurrently in five countries, constituting the largest wave of upheavals on the continent since the end of the Cold War (notably the year 1994, with the end of apartheid, the La Baule speech, the devaluation of the CFA franc, and the Rwandan genocide).